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I 
One meets familiar concepts in Being and Time— 
"mood," "discourse," "World," "freedom," "under-
standing," and all sorts of others. But they're like 
people one knew once who've changed completely: The 
familiar features that once marked them have been wiped 
away or rearranged so radically that all they've kept 
is a name. Reading Heidegger's book one has to learn 
what these concepts mean all over again; one has to 
approach them fresh, without preconceptions, if one 
wants to understand them. 
The way Heidegger writes makes that difficult. All 
too often he just gives us a word whose meaning he has 
changed without telling us how he has changed it; we 
have the new meaning—Heidegger's—but not the old one. 
This makes it hard for us even to comprehend the new 
concept, and harder still to take its measure. If one. 
has no inkling of the continuity between conceptual 
meanings and if one can't sense what old problems 
Heidegger wants the new meanings to solve then one can 
hardly understand Being and Time, much less criticize 
it. 
If Heidegger doesn't give us a way into the book 
himself we have to approach it on our own; and this 
essay tries to do that, not for the whole book but for 
one concept—the concept of understanding—and really 
not for the whole of that concept but for a part of 
it—the sense in which understanding is free. What 
follows surveys a problem which Heidegger's sense of 
understanding addresses (if not in intention at least 
in effect) and tries to solve. I contrast the old 
concept of understanding which led to the problem with 
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the new concept; by doing this I want to convey more 
clearly just what Heidegger means by understanding 
(verstehen). And I want to engage it critically. For 
once we see this new meaning clearly, we will also see 
that it has faults of its own that its novelty doesn't 
erase. 
II. 
Heidegger's notion that understanding is free 
addresses a problem that one finds in its most accute 
form in Kant. The problem is familiar. How does one 
recognize both the necessity one finds in experienced 
nature—and in human action as part of nature—while at 
the same time recognizing that man as a moral being 
acts freely and responsibly? Kant thought that he 
recognized truth in both these claims. But even those 
most sympathetic to Kant would agree that he brought 
the two contentions into harmony only by taking the 
force out of the second of them. When Kant finishes 
it's difficult to see how freedom could be a real 
possibility for human beings at all. 
Kant thinks of freedom as a "kind of causality that 
belongs to living beings insofar as they are rational" 
or "the power that a rational being has of acting in 
accordance with his conception of laws"—in accordance, 
that is, with principles (particularly moral 
principles) that a rational being can use to guide his 
actions. Kant contrasts this ability with what he 
calls "natural necessity," the causal determinism that 
moves the world as we understand it. Any event that we 
can understand scientifically, Kant says, we must 
understand as determined completely by antecedent 
causes that precede the event in time. 
Kant thinks of "human action" in both ways. If one 
thinks of such action as an event in the world 
experienced in space and time, one must think of it as 
completely determined. According to the first Critique 
this is because any event in the experienced world must 
be experienced as causally determined if it can be 
experienced at all. Kant gives us a tortuously 
complicated argument in the first Critique to prove 
this proposition. I won't discuss that argument here; 
its central point is evident: Causal determinism must 
be a feature of the experienced world if experience of 
a world as one in space and time is to be possible. 
And as far as we can experience human actions as events 
in the spatio-temporal world we have to understand and 
explain those actions as completely determined. 
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Free action then has to occur outside of or beyond 
space and time and so beyond what we can experience; 
Kant is quite serious when he says in the Groundwork 
that no example from experience can be given of free 
moral action, because such an example would destroy the 
coherence of experience as the first Critique details 
it. If autonomous action is outside space and time, 
it is consistent with determined events, which do take 
place in space and time. Kant expresses this by saying 
that what holds of the "phenomenal" world (determinism) 
does not necessarily hold of the "noumenal" world. 
While any action that appears to us must be understood 
as determined, it is at least theoretically possible 
that such an action is free "in itself"—apart from our 
experience. And (Kant thinks) freedom is not only 
theoretically possible but also practically necessary. 
We don't need to look at Kant's arguments for 
freedom's necessity either. Because even if those 
arguments hold they leave us with a sense of freedom 
that very few would accept; Kant's freedom is a power 
to which one can't apply spatial or (more importantly) 
temporal categories. Strictly speaking this self-
caused autonomous action doesn't "happen" at all. 
Space and time, modes of apprehension that belong to 
our experience, don't apply to free action. And 
neither does the scientific category of cause. Kant's 
free will doesn't operate in any world where it would 
make a difference; it slips through the only categories 
that we can use to understand it. 
Kant has harmonized necessity with human freedom 
but he does it at too high a price. Freedom becomes a 
power that we can't comprehend, something almost 
magical—a power that causes, though we can't say what 
kind of cause it is; a power that works, although it 
works at no time. And although one might think this is 
simply a problem in the way Kant conceives freedom one 
can just as easily see a problem with the way Kant 
conceives human understanding. If he's given freedom 
too little power—it can't work anywhere or any time— 
he's given understanding too much: It works everywhere 
and at all times. If the categories (like cause) are 
necessary for the possibility of experience itself, and 
if they are the categories of a mechanistic and 
deterministic world, then one can't understand free 
action as a possibility that can become real in space 
and time. Kant's understanding pushes autonomy into 
the shadows, out of any place where it could possibly 
operate. Kant doesn't save ethics from science because 
his conception of scientific understanding leaves no 
coherent freedom to save. 
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III. 
Heidegger is certainly not trying in Being and Time 
to "save" ethics from science. He is trying to do 
"fundamental ontology"—what we might describe as an 
attempt to investigate the essence of human beings, to 
uncover and describe what human beings are in their 
most fundamental or ontologically basic condition. He 
thus hopes to describe Human Being as Human Being is 
"in itself," apart from any secondary perspective—for 
example, a scientific perspective—that other 
descriptions of human being might take. And though 
Heidegger's fundamental ontology does not explicitly 
address itself to the Kantian question, the effect of 
that ontology—if it is correct—is to revolve the 
problem of harmonizing science and freedom around a new 
axis. We can grasp the essence of human understanding 
and of the world first understood by human beings, 
Heidegger thinks, by grasping how they function 
existentially. By seeing understanding existentially— 
which means simply seeing understanding as it is in its 
ontologically primary sense—we can see how both a 
scientific understanding of man and an ethical 
understanding of man derive from and depend on a prior 
existential understanding. And because existential 
understanding is itself free, we can also see how 
derivative modes of understanding (like science) must 
also finally be grounded in freedom. If Heidegger is 
right even scientific views of the world are based on 
an existential understanding of an existential world, 
and it is absurd to suppose that science can contradict 
its existential basis by denying, in any way, the 
possibility of human freedom. 
Taken in its existential sense, understanding can 
also be characterized as "disclosedness." As 
disclosedness understanding acts, it projects, it 
allows us to grasp or get hold of an existential 
world—the world that is our possibilities—and thus 
enables us to grasp things within this world as 
meaningful or significant things. For Heidegger, then, 
"man" and "world" are not ontologically separate, even 
when "world" is taken to mean something like "the 
collection or totality of things that exist", because 
although those things or objects can exist apart from 
man, they can't meaningfully exist apart from him. 
Heidegger devotes much of his existential analysis to 
explaining how man and world are in this way 
inseparable. He wants to explain, that is, how human 
existence ontologically conditions the possibility of 
the significance of any object, event, etc., in the 
traditionally-conceived "world." Two aspects of 
284 
existence, mood and understanding, are particularly 
important here. 
State-of-mind, or mood is to Heidegger's vision a 
kind of "attunement." But Dasein does not "attune" 
itself toward any particular object or event; 
Heidegger's sense of mood is not, for example, the 
sense in which one might be in a "good" or a "bad" mood 
because of something one could point to—that one has 
failed a test, or lost one's job, for instance. Mood 
taken ontologically attunes us to our Being-in-the-
World; and by that Heidegger means that mood attunes us 
to our possibilities of our existential world. Mood is 
thus existentially necessary for any particular object 
or event in the traditional world to matter to us. If 
we were not attuned to our existential possibilities, 
it would be impossible for any particular thing to be 
significant or insignificant to us. 
Understanding projects those possibilities to which 
mood attunes us. "To project" means "to cast forward, 
or beyond," and this is precisely the sense in which 
Heidegger thinks we project ourselves when we project 
our possibilities: We cast ourselves forward into the 
future, beyond what we are in the present or what we 
were in the past. 
Heidegger describes mood and understanding as 
"eguiprimordial." The word sounds dark and muddy but 
Heidegger means something simple by it. Being-in-the-
World always includes both mood and understanding: 
mood always has its understanding and understanding has 
its mood, neither is prior or "more primordial" than 
the other. One doesn't first attune oneself to what 
surrounds one and then project possibilities for 
oneself; one can be in a mood or state of mind only if 
one already understands. The opposite also holds. One 
doesn't understand without a mood. Both structure our 
"thrown" Being-in-the-World and our ordinary meaningful 
experience of the things around us. 
Existential understanding makes possible our 
ordinary, everyday kind of familiarity with the "world" 
of objects and events in which we live. When we 
ordinarily understand something, one might suppose, we 
grasp what that something is. For Heidegger, things in 
their ontologically primary sense are zuhandgQ—things 
ready-to-hand, objects or things of use: We've 
grasped what a pen is when we've grasped it as a 
writing instrument or a hammer when we've grasped it as 
a tool for pounding. This is not by any means an 
intellectual grasp. Heidegger does not see it as an 
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ability to give a definition of a pen, or to detail 
scientifically a hammer's physical characteristics. We 
understand the pen,or the hammer in Heidegger's sense 
when we use them. 
This kind of everyday understanding depends on a 
prior ontological understanding. Heidegger dis-
tinguishes the two by designating the former 
"interpretation": All objects of use are involved with 
other objects; in as much as they refer to othei 
objects that form a complex within which any particular 
object is used. When one uses a particular object, one 
"interprets" it by assigning it a place within such an 
equipmental complex; As Heidegger describes iy„ one 
"lets it be in such a way that it is itself. ' I 
interpret the pen when 1 write with it, which moans 
that 1 involve it, in the writing, with other items of 
equipment that form the writing-complex-the paper, <i 
place to sit, a lamp, a desk and so on. 
We interpret, these smaller complexes by referring 
them to even wider complexes. The contexts in which we 
use each piece of equipment refer to other's, and 
eventually all these complexes refer to something Lor 
the sake of which they are, which is always Dasein. 
Dasein is the "ultimate for-the-sake-of-which," the 
being that exists for the sake of itself, as opposed to 
equipmental complexes which exist (meaningfully) only 
"for-tho-sake-of" Dasein. 
Since the meaning of equipmenfa I complexes depends 
on Dasein's possibilities, all i nterpretatJon—even 
seeing—presupposes a prior existential 
understanding. For if Dasein projected no 
possibilities, equipmental complexes would serve no 
purposes; and since equipmental complexes have 
significance only in their relation to Dasein's 
possibilities and purposes these comp lexer; would he 
existentially insignificant, and meaningless, without 
Dasein. By projecting ourselves pi our 
possi I) i I i t i es — b y exist, i ng—we have also projected a 
structure within which things can then be Interpreted. 
And what we project (and structure) in understanding is 
the world, taken ontologically and ex is tentia I Iy. 
Heidegger thinks, then, that a particular thing in 
significant when it is involved in an equipiiK-nt.il 
complex. And equipmental complexes are significant 
only through their relation lo basein's possibilities 
oi its world. Meaning or significance, in the sense of 
interpretation, is primarily a relation things have to 
Dasein':; possibilities. ' In its ontologicaJ sense, 
?86 
though, meaning is that structure in which things, when 
related, have meaning. That sense of "meaning" or 
"significance" is "world" in the sense of "Dasein 1s 
possibilities." Thus Dasein's possibilities, projected 
in understanding, are the existential conditions of the 
possibility of the meaningfulness of anything at all. 
"World" ,is Dasein's project or Dasein 's 
possibilities. And since each Dasein's project is 
itself, world is Dasein (in the sense that each Dasein 
is its possibilities, as that for the sake of which it 
exists.) The world, then, is not an object like the 
objects to which it lends significance. We might see 
it on the model of Husserl's distinction between noema 
and noesis: for Husserl the noema (or meaning) 
"accompanies" every noesis (or act of meaning-giving) 
not as an object towards which the act is directed but 
as the meaning of the act itself. In the same way, 
world is not some object towards which projection or 
understanding directs itself but is the meaning of that 
projection as its possibilities. 
In what sense, though, is this projection or 
possibilities of of a world free? Dasein's essence, 
Heidegger says, is its existence. Existence is our 
projection of our selves into the future, in the sense 
that we.gproject possibilities to which we are attuned 
in mood. And existence, Heidegger never tires of 
repeating, is an issue. In what sense is it an issue? 
If an "issue" is an "unsettled matter that calls for a 
decision," then existence is an issue in the sense that 
Dasein must decide his own essence in existence; that 
is, he must decide himself. 
But exactly what this means is not clear and 
clarifying it is vital; for if we can see in what sense 
existence is an issue, we can see in what sense 
understanding is free. It's easier first to see what 
Heidegger does not mean. He does not mean that Dasein 
can decide whether to project possibilities or not, for 
this would be eguivalent to saying that Dasein can 
decide to be Dasein. Heidegger denies this 
emphatically. We are thrown into existence, he says, 
and by that he means at least that we cannot abrogate 
the necessity to decide ourselves. Nor can Heidegger 
mean that in existence we choose to take up 
possibilities already determined for us. For this 
would mean that in the case of any particular Dasein 
significance, or world, would be ontologically prior to 
existence, or projection. If in any particular case 
possibilities (and so Dasein itself) were given, then 
existence would not be a projection of possibilities 
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but simply an acceptance of them. It would also mean 
that ordinary everyday significance or interpretation 
would precede understanding—which Heidegger, again, 
explicitly denies. 
Heidegger means that existence confronts us with 
the issue of what possibilities to project and thus of 
what self to make of ourselves. Projection of 
possibilities is thus a decision; when we project 
possibilities, or understand, we decide what we are to 
be. The issue is then "what self are we to make of 
ourselves?" and to decide on that issue is to nproject possibilities, or ourselves, or a world. And 
(Heidegger seems to think) if nothing can be given 
beforehand that determines what possibilities any 
particular person projects, that projection or 
understanding must be free. 
Projection, or understanding, then, is free like a 
decision is free; nothing prior to the decision—prior 
to projection—can limit that decision and so determine 
it. Nothing can limit that decision because prior to 
it nothing significant exists; projection itself 
decides what significance will be given to things. 
Heidegger seems to think that if things did have 
significant characteristics prior to projection those 
characteristics might impose some restrictions on what 
possibilities Dasein could project. But since through 
projection things or situations "within the world" 
first gain meaning originally, then (it seems) 
projection must be free. 
To summarize: Dasein's essence is its existence. 
Its existence is to transcend, or to project 
possibilities to which it is attuned. That 
transcendance is a free action: Dasein*s Being is 
such, Heidegger maintains, that its Being is an issue 
which Dasein must decide. Possibilities are what 
Dasein is, and the meaning or significance of those 
possibilities is the world, the ultimate backdrop 
against which objects ready-to-hand in the world are 
interpreted. The existential world must be 
understood—that is, significant possibilities must be 
projected—in order for any particular thing or object 
to have meaning. What possibilities Dasein will 
project is, again, an issue for Dasein to decide; and 
so the significance of objects, since it depends on 
this prior projection of understanding, is also in a 
sense an issue for Dasein—because projection of 
possibilities is itself an issue. 
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IV. 
A Heideggerian analysis of the Kantian problem 
raised earlier would then read this way: had Kant 
penetrated to the ontological stratum which Heidegger 
investigates, he would have seen that the confusion 
generated by the competing claims of scientific 
understanding and moral categories could be untangled. 
Opposing Kant's dualisms of theory and practice, of 
understanding and practical reason, Heidegger 
concentrates on a different type of understanding 
altogether—an existential understanding. And he 
claims that the lived understanding found in existence, 
and the life-world thus understood, are ontologically 
prior roots of both the "scientific" and "moral" worlds 
and of our understanding of those "worlds." 
Human Being's primary mode of understanding occurs 
through projection of possibilities, whose own 
significance - gives meaning to objects within the 
ordinary world. This understanding is primary in the 
sense that in order to understand (let's say) 
scientific propositions about objects in the world 
including those about human beings, those propositions 
must somehow relate to the world of Dasein's 
possibilities. Indeed those propositions are 
significant only to the extent that they can be so 
related. 
Since existential understanding is free, and since 
all other modes of understanding derive from this basic 
mode, then scientific understanding must also grow out 
of human freedom. But if that is correct, then 
scientific understanding cannot contradict the freedom 
that is its ultimate ontological basis. Kant thought 
that scientific understanding was necessary and 
universal because it based itself on unchangeable 
categories. However, existential understanding grounds 
the very structure of science, so scientific categories 
cannot lie beyond our power to change them. The 
imperatives of morality are in the same position; they 
too have significance or meaning only in relation to 
Dasein's possibilities, which Dasein projects freely. 
Moral categories, like those of science, rest finally 
on existential decision. 
When one adopts this position, the Kantian dilemma 
vanishes. When Kant tried to reconcile free moral 
action with scientific experience, he did so with the 
understanding that although science described 
experienced man accurately, morality and freedom 
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applied to man as he is in himself. But man as he is 
in himself cannot be experienced $ 2and man's freedom cannot be theoretically understood. In uncovering 
existential understanding Heidegger shows how the most 
basic or significant experience is impossible apart 
from understanding's free projection of possibilities. 
It is not that the freedom of human action needs to be 
beyond experience because experience is ordered 
causally. Meaningful experience itself is possible 
only because understanding is free. From an 
ontological standpoint, then, Heidegger shows how Kant 
described both contexts incorrectly. Both are 
dependent, neither can claim to get at man as he is in 
himself; and thus the problem is not one of 
accomodating morality to science or vice versa, but of 
seeing how both science and morality find their roots 
in existence. 
V. 
This "Heideggerian account," though, presumes that 
the fundamental ontology on which it rests is itself 
sound. But there are complications in Heidegger's 
ontology. I will now consider two objections to his 
analysis of "understanding." Though Heidegger can 
answer the first objection, that answer itself leads 
naturally to the second objection—and this second 
objection is one that Heidegger cannot answer. The 
relationships between the two will become clear, I 
think, as the discussion advances. 
23 
The first objection says this: Understanding and 
state of mind constitute our Being-in-the-World, our 
existence, which is an issue for us. Projection of 
possibilities—that is, understanding—is the 
ontological condition that makes possible the 
significance of things within the world. Without 
understanding, things have no significant 
characteristics, since only by relating them to the 
whole of significance which is the existential world 
can things be interpreted at all. But if things or 
objects (and the world taken as the collection or 
totality of objects) have no significant 
characteristics apart from or without projection of the 
world of possibilities or understanding, what can limit 
our projection of possibilities, our understanding 
itself? What prevents me from projecting any 
possibility I wish? If things have no significant 
characteristics apart from projection which could limit 
projection, and if understanding's content cannot be 
given, then nothing can limit the projection of 
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possibilities. And if nothing can limit the projection 
then that projection must simply be arbitrary. 
What prevents me, for example, from projecting as a 
possibility listening to a 2concert by the Chicago Symphony in my living room? If nothing has meaning 
before I project such possibilities who could say that 
this possibility isn't genuine? Heidegger can't answer 
this by saying that we all project the same 
possibilities so that such an example is contrary to 
fact; for this would imply that human essence preceded 
human existence, that our projection of possibilities 
is fixed and substantial, given for us all. That way 
is closed to a philosopher for whom one's existence is 
an issue. 
Heidegger could, however, answer though that 
objecting this way simply misconstrues projection by 
characterizing it as "arbitrary." Before projection of 
possibilities in understanding, things have no 
significant characteristics because projection is 
necessary for things to acquire significance 
originally. And if the objectionable sense of 
"arbitrary" is the sense in which "arbitrary" means 
"without consideration of relevant facts" due, let's 
suppose, to willful disregard to the facts or to 
caprice, then understanding cannot be arbitrary— 
because, before projection or understanding, 
consideration of relevant facts is impossible. If in 
other words one had to consider relevant facts or fail 
to consider them before projection of possibilities, 
then projection could be arbitrary if it proceeded 
without due consideration of those facts, or if it 
proceeded in willful disregard for them. But if before 
projection there are no relevant facts then 
consideration of them isn't even possible. And before 
projection there are no relevant facts, because there 
are no facts. Nothing has any signifincant 
characteristics at all, and so no facts can be 
expressed. 
The category of "arbitrary" or its contrasts 
("fair" or "considered") doesn't apply to projection at 
all. It's not that the absence of established rules or 
significant characteristics of objects makes 
understanding arbitrary, for in the absence of 
understanding—that is, before significance—nothing 
can be relevant or irrelevant, significant or 
insignificant. Thus the conditions under which 
understanding could be arbitrary or nonarbitrary don't 
obtain. 
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This answer to the objection, though, cuts two 
ways. For although it answers a serious charge, it 
raises other questions about understanding that are 
just as serious. The most immediate question is this: 
if we can't think of projection as even possibly 
arbitrary, can we really think of it as free? 
To this we have to answer "no." Arbitrariness 
cannot characterize projection, nor can its opposites, 
because before projection no things in the world have 
significant characteristics that projection could 
ignore. And if calling projection "arbitrary" depends 
on projection taking place in willful disregard of the 
facts or in willful ignorance of them, then projection 
cannot be arbitrary. 
But if projection can't be arbitrary it can't be a 
decision. A decision must decide something—in this 
case the issue of existence. Here, though, what 
projection supposedly "decides" can't in principle be 
formulated. Before the decision, before understanding, 
nothing is significant. If that is true then the 
"issue" that projection decides can't be formualted, 
because in order for the issue to be formulated it 
would have to have some meaning or some significance. 
And if projection is the condition for meaningfulness, 
then in order for existence to be an issue projection 
or understanding must already have taken place. 
In deciding it must at least be possible to 
formulate what the matter that presents itself for 
decision is, and it must be possible in making one's 
decision to take into account factors that speak for 
and against various alternatives. This is true even 
though in some cases—like the cases where one decides 
arbitrarily—one doesn't take significant factors into 
account at all. In the case spoken of here, however, 
nothing is significant before the decision— 
projection—occurs; and so it is not possible either to 
formulate what one is deciding, or to take into account 
factors that might be relevant to making the decision. 
In other words projection doesn't decide, because 
before projection or understanding nothing has meaning. 
And if one can't decide to project one set of 
possibilities rather than another, in what sense can 
one call projection or understanding free? One might 
be able to call projection free if it were possible to 
decide what possibilities to project even though one 
didn't actually decide. But if a person can't decide 
at all it makes no sense to call the decision free. 
The reason that Heidegger's projection cannot be a free 
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decision underlies why it cannot be an arbitrary 
decision: It is not a decision at all. 
Certainly one needs to ask here: 1) What sense of 
"free" one has in mind when one says "decisions are 
free" and 2) whether there isn't some equally valid 
sense of "free" that would apply to Heidegger's notion 
of understanding. As to (1), a very simple sense of 
"free" will do: the sense in which one can choose or 
decide from among alternatives unhindered by forces 
beyond one's control. It is obvious that if 
alternatives cannot be formulated it makes no sense to 
say that one chooses among them; it makes no sense even 
to say that there are alternatives. How, then, if 
projection is not a choice, is it a free choice? 
As to (2): Perhaps there is some other sense in 
which projection is free. Could one for example 
maintain that projection is free simply because nothing 
limits it, because (in other words) nothing demands 
that any particular Dasein project one set of 
possibilities rather than any other? Could it be that 
Heidegger means only that understanding's content is 
not determined by anything prior to its projection and 
is therefore free? 
This might seem an enticing answer. But if this is 
the sense in which understanding is free, it would not 
include the sense of freedom marked by saying existence 
is an issue. In saying that existence is an issue 
Heidegger means to say that to exist is to decide what 
possibilities to project for ourselves. And in order 
for existence to be an issue there must exist something 
meaningful that projection of possibilities can decide, 
something that can meaningfully present itself as an 
issue. Heidegger seems, it is true, to think that 
existence confronts us with the question of what we are 
to make of ourselves. But if meaning arises only from 
projection, and not before, how could the issue of 
existence—even when phrased as a question— 
meaningfully confront us? The sense of "free" one has 
to ascribe to understanding is the sense in which 
decisions are free. And unless projection can decide 
what possibilities to project, one can't call 
projection "free"—at least not in the sense that 
Heidegger has in mind. 
VI. 
After setting out Heidegger's concepts like this— 
as if they spoke to Kant—we can notice not only where 
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those concepts go wrong but also where they lead us. 
Compare Heidegger and Kant for a moment: Kant thought 
that the categories of human understanding were 
necessary. Heidegger thinks that at its most basic 
level human understanding is completely free. Both 
views are faulted. Kant failed to make a coherent 
place for responsibility and freedom not only because 
he thought that the causal determinism that Newtonian 
mechanics enshrined was the only kind of causality that 
could make experience possible, but also because he 
thought of experience as essentially limited to the 
kind of experience out of which one could make science. 
So naturally Kant thought that the categories of 
understanding stood beyond our power to change them. 
Rather than seeing understanding as unchangeably 
structuring any and every experience Heidegger sees 
understanding as having a deeper basis in human 
existence, as having a function which on the 
existential level it freely performs. But the kind of 
freedom Heidegger gives existential understanding lias 
no more coherence than does Kant's freedom of the will. 
Kant's freedom lacks a world in which to work. But so 
does Heidegger's; while his freedom of understanding 
allows understanding to make, in effect, the meaningful 
world within which moral freedom can then operate, 
understanding has no context itself for its own acts. 
Having seen this we can see beyond it. Can't we 
see, for example, that we can understand in different 
ways, and that there are different experiences—moral, 
aesthetic, religious perhaps —for which different 
categories are appropriate? And is there any good 
reason to insist that any one kind of experience or 
structure is ontologically prior simpliciter? Both 
scientific and existential experience exist—With that 
much we can agree with botli Heidegger and Kant. But do 
we have to put either up as fundamental? Even further: 
If we agree that there is such a thing as an 
existential understanding, do we then have to agree 
that such an understanding is either free or 
determined? Why does it have to be one or the other? 
I put this last paragraph as questions because I can't 
claim—not on the strength of what has ben said h e r e -
to be looking clearly at the territory that Kant and 
Heidegger open up. I don't question, though, if the 
analyses I've given of Kant and Heidegger are correct, 
that we ought at least look harder in the directions 
towards which these thinkers point us. 
University of Colorado, Boulder 
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NOTES 
Immanuel Kant, Groundwork Of The Metaphysic Of 
Morals, trans. II. J. Pa ton (New York: Harper and Row, 
1974), pp. 36, 63, 98. References are to the second 
German edition of this work. 
2Kant, p. 98. 
3 
Cf. on this point Robert Paul Wolff, The Autonomy 
of Reason (New York, Harper and Row: 1974), p. 99. 
A 
Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John 
Macguarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1962), p. 171. All references are to the English 
pagination of the book. 
5 
Cf. here Richard Schmitt, Martin Heidegger On 
Being Human (New York: Random House, 1969), pp. 105-
06. 
6Heidegger, p. 172. 
7 
Schmitt, pp. 154-56. 
Q 
SZ, p. 185; also Schmitt pp. 187-91. 
g 
Heidegger, p. 183. 
*°Heidegger, p. 95 ff. For Heidegger even natural 
objects are ready-to-hand. 
1 1Schmitt, 169. 
1 2Heidegger, p. 187. 
l 3Heidegger, p. 160. 
14 
Heidegger, p. 194. 
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15 
16 
17 
Heidegger, p. 193. 
Heidegger, p. 152. 
Heidegger, p. 402. 
18 
It must be emphasized that for Heidegger 
projection of possibilities and mood go together. If 
Dasein did not project possibilities there would be 
nothing to which Dasein could be attuned in mood for 
there would be no situation, no being-there: A 
situation is possible only if possibilities are 
projected, or if there is understanding. Cf. on this 
point in a paper by Professor Wesley Morriston, 
"Heidegger on the World" Man and World, Vol. V no. 4 
(November, 1972), pp. 461-62. 
19 Heidegger, p. 194. 
2 0 W e have yet to investigate whether this assertion 
makes sense. I will conclude, finally, that it does 
not. 
2 1 B y "limit" I mean that nothing can force our 
decision of ourselves to take any content whatever. 
22 Cf. Kant , p. 28. 
23 
This objection 
different results) in 
Morriston cited earlier. 
is 
the 
made (though 
article by 
wi th very 
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